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Empowerment: The Intersection of Identity and Power in Collective Action
Collective action is a particularly fruitful area in which to study the intersection of power and identity. In the last 20 years, research on this topic — particularly research examining crowd events — has yielded a number of important insights into the nature of identity, the empowerment process and the relation between the two. This chapter will focus on social psychological accounts of subjective power in collective action, which explain how empowerment can operate as both ‘input’ and ‘output’ in such action. 
The chapter begins by putting this theoretical work into historical context. The concept of empowerment originally belonged to activists, and it inevitably involves identity, for it raises the question of ‘power for who’? Social psychology has largely studied subjective power in collective action through the concept of group efficacy, which in recent models is linked to the social identity perspective. In the main part of this chapter, we describe the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour, from which we derive a series of novel implications and predictions for the causes of empowerment in collective action. Specifically, we will show three things: first that the basis of empowerment in collective action is the sense of unity, which is explained by common self-categorization; second, that this psychological unity is the condition for expectations of support for action that instantiates a subordinated identity, something that cannot be achieved by individuals acting alone; and, third, that this instantiation can transform the participants themselves and is a positive emotional experience. In the remaining sections of the chapter, we draw out some possible psychosocial consequences of empowerment in collective action, before examining the question of how collective actors deal with defeat.
Empowerment in History and Theory
Scattered among historical, autobiographical and political accounts of struggles, strikes, riots and uprisings are stories of identity transformation. In these stories, the transformed identities are socially shared, newly confident and associated with positive emotion. The US urban riots of the 1960s provide some examples. Thus, Boesel, Goldberg and Marx (1971) quote a participant from the Plainfield rebellion, in which Black residents usurped the power of the police, to illustrate their enhanced solidarity and sense of collective pride:
You see how things are changing? It used to be that one black man couldn't stand to see another black man do something. We were all jealous of one another and each one tried to pull the other down... But since the riots, we're not niggers any more. We're black men, and most of the people in the community have learned this.
(Quoted in Boesel et al., 1971, p. 82)
Another example comes from the events in France in May 1968. A student protest over the closure of the University at Sorbonne culminated in a night of barricades and street-fighting with riot police. Soon, widespread occupations, wildcat strikes and huge demonstrations almost toppled the government of De Gaulle. One account states how ‘[w]ithin a few days, young people of 20 attained a level of understanding and a political and tactical sense which many who had been in the revolutionary movement for 30 years or more were still sadly lacking’; moreover, ‘[t]he tumultuous development of the students' struggle ... transformed both the relation of forces in society and the image, in people's minds, of established institutions and of established leaders’ (Anon., 1968, p. 51). Occupying students displayed increased confidence in their own abilities and capacities: ‘The occupants of Censier suddenly cease to be unconscious, passive objects shaped by particular combinations of social forces; they become conscious, active subjects who begin to shape their own social activity’ (Gregoire & Perlman, 1969, p. 37; emphasis in original); ‘people who have never expressed ideas before, who have never spoken in front of professors and students, become confident in their ability’ (ibid., p. 41). 
These examples of psychological transformation in collective action might be classed as examples of empowerment. One definition of empowerment is that it is ‘a process of awareness and capacity building leading to greater participation, to greater decision-making power and control, and to transformative action’ (Karl, 1995, p. 14). The concept appears to have originated from movements like feminism and other struggles for civil rights and social change in the late 1960s. The concept of empowerment captures the idea of subordinated groups struggling to change their situation and in doing so becoming more conscious of the possibility of such change. Through their actions, subordinated groups come to see themselves as agents of their own transformation. The notion of empowerment thus implies that a group’s liberation comes from itself, and is not given to it by other, dominant, groups. The link between social change and changed identity is echoed in some contemporary accounts of empowerment in women’s movements. Thus empowerment is conceptualized as a narrative of self-transformation (e.g., Britt & Heise, 2000), or as a set of skills (e.g., communication, organization) that participants acquire through involvement in campaign activities (e.g., Salt & Layzell, 1985). 
Today, however, most of the results of any internet search for ‘empowerment’ do not refer to groups in struggle for social change, but to institutions, services, businesses, and professional groups who make use of the term in ways that are quite different than its earlier usage as an activists’ category. For example ‘empowerment’ is now the slogan of the World Bank (2011). This co-option is also evident in academia – for example, in health psychology (e.g., Zimmerman, Israel, Schulz, & Checkoway, 1992), community psychology (e.g., Ratna & Rifkin, 2007), social work (e.g., Thompson, 2008), and management studies (e.g., Spreitzer, 1995). In all these cases, the concept of empowerment has been detached from its links with social change. For example, whereas the activists’ ‘empowerment’ referred to a process of liberation and was politically potent, ‘empowerment’ in management theory is essentially a tool for using others for management’s own purposes. These current usages therefore are a world away from the exhilarating sense of possibility evident in our examples from uprisings and rebellions. 
So, given this co-option, and indeed the ease with which the meaning has been debased, why would researchers of collective action persist with it? The short answer is that empowerment remains a meaningful concept to activists. Many of them still use the term because it captures something about their experience that other concepts do not (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005). Before outlining a model of empowerment in collective action, however, we first need to examine how most social psychologists have addressed the issue of subjective power in collective action, which is mainly through the concept of efficacy.
Subjective Power in the Social Psychology of Collective Action: The Concept of Efficacy
In social psychology, research on collective action –– including marches, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, and riots –– has been flourishing in the past few years, with the publication of an increasing number of journal articles and special issues (e.g., Becker, 2012; Van Zomeren & Klandermans, 2011; Van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). In these accounts, the concept used to refer to subjective power in collective action is not empowerment but efficacy. The advantages of the concept of efficacy include the fact that it is well-established outside of collective action research –– it has proven utility in clinical and individual psychology more generally –– and that it is a measurable construct, with robust measures and scales. 
It is specifically the concept of group efficacy, based originally on Bandura’s (1997) work, defined as the belief that a problem can be solved through group effort, that has been used in collective action research since the 1990s (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). The conclusion of these and many other more recent studies is that group efficacy beliefs are a key predictor of individuals’ participation in collective action (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2006; Tausch et al., 2011, Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). In a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) found that group efficacy beliefs were a medium-sized predictor of collective action intentions (r = .36) and behaviour (r = .25). Alongside other key variables (identification and perceptions of injustice), efficacy predicted collective action, particularly against incidental disadvantages rather than against structural disadvantages. Efficacy and cognate concepts are therefore central to a number of models of collective action, including the dual-pathway model (Sturmer & Simon, 2004) and the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
The concept of efficacy has therefore proved extremely useful in research on collective action. However, in relation to the question of the intersection of identity and power, there are two limitations in most of the existing work on group efficacy as an account of subjective power in collective action. 
First, while group efficacy would seem to be a possible component of empowerment, the concept of empowerment is much broader than that of efficacy. Efficacy refers to a belief about a particular situation, agent or goal; empowerment encompasses this but also has other connotations. This is clear from the historical examples illustrated above, and from phenomenological research on empowerment amongst activists, in which positive emotion is to the fore in their accounts (Drury et al., 2005; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005). The concept of empowerment captures the fact that world-changing collective action is a deeply desired goal, and so participation in it is a deeply positive, self-changing experience; participants’ new understanding that the world is tractable, and that therefore they can change their position of subordination, is exciting and exhilarating. Empowerment refers to participants’ understanding of their ability to transform social relations. If it is a cognition, it is a hot one.
A second limitation is that, almost all group efficacy studies and models of collective action have examined subjective power only as an antecedent or predictor, or at best a mediator, of that action. Yet, again, the historical illustrations and case studies of crowd events tell of the importance of subjective power also as an effect or outcome of collective action, both as arising within the event (Drury & Reicher, 1999) and as an enduring psychological after-effect (Drury & Reicher, 2005). The causal effects of collective action on the sense of group efficacy have also been demonstrated in the laboratory. For instance, in one experiment, participants confronted with an illegitimate outgroup action (e.g., genetically modified food) who signed a petition scored higher in collective efficacy than those who did not have the opportunity to sign the petition or who did have the opportunity but who did not sign it (Van Zomeren, Drury, & Van der Staaij, 2013).
Arguably, therefore, some models of collective action, such as the SIMCA (Van Zomeren et al., 1998), describe the predictive role of efficacy, but do not explain the process through which collective action itself can change this variable. Recently, however, more dynamic models have been developed which attempt to capture the way that subjective power can be ‘output’ as well as ‘input’ in collective action. For instance, Simon and Klandermans's (2001) model of politicized collective identity posits that, through political struggle, individuals achieve a sense of themselves as being collectively agentic. Thomas, McGarty & Mavor (2009, 2012) add that intra-group discussions can create new, more efficacy-based, identities in collective actors. 
Of these new models, Van Zomeren, Leach and Spears’s (2012) dynamic dual pathway model provides the most detail on the dynamic psychological processes through which undertaking collective action changes levels of group efficacy. The model conceptualizes collective action as a form of approach coping (Lazarus, 1991, 2001), meaning a form of action designed to alter one’s circumstances. In this account, collective action is based on a process in which primary appraisals (notably perceptions of self-relevance of the collective action issue) determine whether one needs to cope in the first place; and secondary appraisals (such as perceptions of the self’s coping potential) determine the most appropriate coping strategy. The model is psychologically dynamic because it makes explicit predictions regarding crucial feedback loops (e.g., from coping back to cognitive reappraisal). For instance, it predicts that undertaking collective action can lead to a change in the perceived relevance of identity as well as in perceptions of group efficacy. The perception of others’ willingness to engage in collective action, which arises from participation itself, suggests stronger mobilization resources that can therefore increase individuals’ belief in group efficacy (Klandermans 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). In other words, undertaking collective action can empower individuals through affecting their appraisal of the group’s coping potential. 
These models of collective action all employ key concepts from the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The same is true of the elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996a, 1996b; Stott & Reicher, 1998), which adds details of the chronological processes of change to the psychological processes described in the dynamic dual pathway model (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). The social identity origins and similarity of scope of these models means that there is considerable overlap between them. However, there are two reasons for focusing on the ESIM for a fuller discussion of empowerment as the intersection of identity and power in collective action. 
The first reason is that while most accounts of collective action refer just to the antecedents and while a few refer also to the consequences, the ESIM does both of these things, as well as referring to what people actually do in that collective action. This is because the ESIM is an account of crowd behaviour. While not all forms of collective action involve crowds, the crowd is nevertheless an important form of collective action both politically — social change is often visible through the crowd (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994) — and theoretically — the crowd is a privileged arena for the understanding of a range of phenomena in social science (Reicher, 2011). The second reason for focussing on the ESIM is that, in contrast to the other models, the empirical and theoretical work surrounding it has explicitly set out to examine empowerment as such, rather than just efficacy.
A Dynamic Intergroup Account of Empowerment in Collective Action
In this part of the chapter, we will first outline the ESIM and then develop its key claims about the process of empowerment in collective action. The ESIM developed from the observation by Reicher and colleagues of a common pattern across a variety of crowd events, including a student protest (Reicher, 1996b), a mass demonstration against local taxation which became a riot (Stott & Reicher, 1998), and cases of football crowd ‘disorder’ (Stott, Hutchison, & Drury, 2001). In essence, the pattern was as follows. Events would begin with a relatively heterogeneous crowd, the majority of which defined themselves as moderates, and a minority who were more radical and sought conflict. However, crowd members were perceived as homogeneous and dangerous by the authorities (notably the police) and treated as such — that is, denied the ability to act in a way they saw as legitimate. This then led to a radicalization amongst moderate crowd members who joined with the radicals in challenging the police. It also changed their views about the authorities and indeed their own identity in relation to the authorities. 
In explicating this pattern, the ESIM involves three elements: concepts, conditions and dynamics (Drury & Reicher, 2009). First, in terms of concepts, social identity is seen as the way in which people understand how they are positioned relative to others, along with the forms of action that make sense from that position; and context is understood as the identity-based action of those forces external to actors which enable or constrain their action (Reicher, 1996a). This point can be illustrated by studies of the 1990 London poll tax riot (Stott & Drury, 1999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998). Here, the context for protesters was the actions of the police — who formed cordons, initiated baton charges and so on. But such actions were at the same time the expression of the police’s identity-based understanding of their relationship to the protesters — as a dangerous and hostile crowd. 
Second, the ESIM suggests that the conditions necessary for the emergence and development of crowd conflict are two-fold. The first condition is an asymmetry of categorical representations between crowd participants and an outgroup such as the police. For example, during the poll tax riot, where crowd members understood their behaviour of sitting down in the road as ‘legal and legitimate protest’, police defined it as a ‘threat to public order’; and where police understood their own action as a defensive response to a situation of growing threat from the crowd, the crowd understood the police action as unprovoked and ‘heavy handed’. The second condition is an asymmetry of power such that the (police) outgroup is able to impose its definition of legitimate practice on the ingroup of crowd participants — for example, through having the technology, organization and strength in numbers to form cordons, coordinate baton charges and thereby constrain the physical movement of the crowd.
Third, there is a dynamic. Police practices which impose a common fate on all crowd can transform a relatively heterogeneous crowd into a homogeneous one. Moreover, to the extent that this police action is seen as not only indiscriminate (i.e., perceived as affecting everyone) but also illegitimate (e.g., denying the right to protest and using offensive tactics to disperse the crowd) then the entire crowd will unite around a sense of opposition to the police. 
The dynamic therefore entails a social repositioning through which a number of dimensions of psychological change occur (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher & Drury, 2011). First, there is change in the content of identity (‘who we are’). Those who initially saw themselves as moderates change their understanding of their relationship with the authorities and hence there is change in their identity; being positioned as radicals, they come to understand themselves as radical. Second, if ‘who we are’ changes, there may be corresponding change in the definition of legitimate group aims and the criteria for success (e.g., from ‘protesting peacefully against the poll tax’ to ‘overcoming the police’). Third, there are changes in the boundaries of the collective self — i.e., in who counts as ingroup and who counts as outgroup. Fourth, where these boundaries become more inclusive, and where the ingroup-outgroup distinction is highly salient, there are feelings of consensus and hence expectations of mutual support; this empowers crowd members to express their radical beliefs and confront the outgroup. These four dimensions of identity change are derived from the original statements of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). While the dimensions are clearly interlinked, most of the research carried out, and the focus here, is on the dimension of empowerment. This research falls into two areas: the role of perceived support and the process of collective self-objectification.
Perceived Support for Group-Normative Action
The basis for empowerment in collective action is participants’ understanding that there is unity, which is a function of people defining themselves as members of the same group (common self-categorization) rather than as individuals. All else being equal, the more people there are who define themselves in the same way, the greater the sense of unity. 
There are a number of possible antecedents of common self-categorization (Turner et al., 1987). But in many of the crowd studies, it was found that common self-categorization and hence unity was a function of common fate; as specified in the ESIM, indiscriminate outgroup action caused individuals and previously separate subgroups to see themselves as part of a single crowd and hence as ‘the same people’. For example, a study of a demonstration at a local council meeting showed that before the event participants were initially part of small, exclusive groups of friends, but they came together as a united force through their shared experience of illegitimate exclusion from the council meeting (Drury & Reicher, 1999). The new sense of crowd unity was evident in participants’ behaviour, as they oriented together, focusing on the same targets, sang and chanted together, and pushed in unison, rather than remaining in small subgroups. But participants also explicitly reported feeling more togetherness with the crowd as whole. Their subsequent empowerment was evident in both the observed and the self-reported increase in the boldness of their actions aimed at disrupting the meeting. 
The reason that being part of a wider social group in which there is agreement about who ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ should do is a component of empowerment is that it is the basis of expectations of support for group-normative action. If there is a common self-categorization and hence a sense of unity, then participants know they will be backed up if they act; they feel more able to act as they know that others are or will be acting in the same way; and they also feel that others won't criticize or stop them and will come to their aid if those they oppose attack them.
This is a cognitive process — in the sense that I know that I will be supported if I perceive (a) that others self-categorize in the same way as me and (b) that these others see me as a group member (meta-perception; Neville & Reicher, 2011). It is also ‘cognitive’ in the sense that the perception of support need not map exactly onto reality to provide encouragement. 
But the process also has an important strategic dimension, in two senses. The first sense in which the process is strategic aspect is the fact that shared identification allows effective coordination of action. If we know that others are relatively similar to us on a relevant dimension, there is a basis for discussion about about the right thing to do for us as a group, in terms of our values and aims in relation to the enemy or target (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher & Levine, 1994). The second sense in which the process has a strategic dimension is evident in attempts at mobilization: We seek to gain social support for our cause by construing the ingroup category inclusively (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The strategic dimension to empowerment is examined in more detail below (‘Dealing with defeat’). 
Collective Self-Objectification
When we believe we have collective support for our aims, what do we do? When our fellows are around us, and when we are not outnumbered or otherwise prevented from overcoming our foes, we try to enact those aims. More specifically, for subordinate groups in struggle — and most crowds in struggle are from subordinate groups — the aim is to enact a group value which is normally impossible to enact for individuals acting alone. Since the subordinate group’s identity is defined in opposition to the powerful other and the (illegitimate) world they represent, acting tangibly upon the world in a way that embodies the subordinate group’s definition of legitimate practice means changing the world. This enactment itself can be empowering and is a positive emotional experience. In the ESIM, we use the term collective self-objectification (CSO)​[1]​ to refer to this joyful self-transforming process whereby participants perceive their collective action to realize (objectify, make concrete) their social identity over against the power of dominant outgroups (Drury & Reicher, 2005). 
What are the conditions for this process? Not all collective action participation empowers. There are many cases of collective action that are not empowering; and some collective actions actually leave participants feeling disempowered (Drury et al., 2005). The outcome or effect of the action as successful seems to matter (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011); it’s not just the taking part. However, this raises the question of what constitutes ‘success’ psychologically. Just as the particular form of crowd action — the targets, contours and limits — reflects a particular definition of identity (Reicher, 1984), so the definition of success is also a function of identity definition. That is, in collective action, the experience of ‘success’ is a matter of actions that serve to create a world which is organized on the basis of ingroup beliefs, values and understandings, over against the power of the outgroup. Thus, one can only determine what is a success or a failure — and hence know what does or does not lead to experiences of empowerment — by understanding the significance of outcomes in relation to the specific understandings associated with a given social identity. Indeed, what might look like failure to outsiders may constitute a success from an ingroup perspective. 
Based on Marx’s concept of labour (1932/ 1975) as self-producing activity​[2]​, we argue that collective action can empower to the extent to which it expresses the collective definition of how the world should be, over against that of dominant forces. Collective action empowers participants when it turns a subjective imperative into an objective feature of the world. In realizing the collective’s (hitherto subordinate) identity, such an action-impact thereby evidences to participants, tangibly, through what they see as the transformed context, that their collective self is indeed an active and powerful subject. In short, collective self-objectification refers to the process whereby self-transformed social context tells us about our own collective agency. Powerlessness is a negative experience (Reicher & Haslam, this volume; Sindic, this volume), and the reversal of this through empowerment and collective self-objectification is therefore experienced positively (Drury et al., 2005). 
Central to the concept of collective self-objectification are claims about the critical role of identity-congruence in collective action. These claims can be organized into (at least) four areas: the empowering effects of identity-congruence in collective action-impacts; the disempowering effects of action-impacts antithetical to the collective identity; changing definitions of success; and the endurance of feelings of empowerment.
The identity-congruence of collective action-impact empowers.
Collective action can be empowering through impact that is immediate to the action or through impact that is mediated. Forms of mass direct action fit the first description, as when an animal rights crowd closes down a factory farm for the day through force of numbers. ‘Mediated’  impact is where the mobilization has such effects in later days or even months — as when the factory farm eventually closes, and this closure is perceived as an effect of the animal rights campaign.
Depending on their definition of ‘politics’, participants might understand the mobilization itself as a successful impact (Hornsey et al., 2006). Put differently, means can also be experienced as ends in themselves. Thus the aim may be to build the movement. This can be achieved through a display (to one’s own group and to others outside the group) of the support for, and power of, the group — as measured by the perceived relative size, coherence, and organization of the crowd on the streets. In  such cases, the demonstration itself — the march and rally, the banners, flags and chants, and the flooding of the streets with ‘our people’ — represents a tangible imposition of our identity on the world. It therefore has empowering effects over and above the effects of expectations of mutual support within the crowd. Thus interviews with activists show that some feel uplifted and encouraged by big demonstrations, and may regard them as a result or achievement in their own right (Drury et al., 2005; Evripidou & Drury, 2013b). 
Action-impacts antithetical to our identity disempower us.
By the same principle that successful collective action provides evidence that our group is powerful, successful outgroup action against us can provide counter-evidence to this self-perception. Defeats, or collective actions in which the identities of others antithetical to us are instantiated and hence where there is re-imposition of outgroup values, are experienced as disempowering. There are, again, different forms of such antagonistic identity instantiation, broadly corresponding to the opposite of the empowering congruent action-impacts described above. 
First, there are also those events where the preconditions for collective self-objectification are insufficient. An example is a Mayday demonstration march against austerity held in Greece in 2012 where numbers and organization were both regarded as poor, and hence where some participants felt disempowered by their own event (Evripidou & Drury, 2013b) — particularly those participants who defined their political practice in terms of this kind of large-scale movement-building. 
Second, there are cases where exemplars of the dominant group actively defeat the collective during the mobilization itself and impose themselves. An example would be the case of the crowd that tried to prevent the eviction of a tree in an anti-roads campaign, but who were forcefully swept aside by police so that the tree could then be felled (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005). 
Third, because there may be different definitions of appropriate conduct and political aims, it is possible that participation in the same collective action may be experienced as empowering by some participants but disempowering by others. At a mobilization against the UK governing party’s annual conference, both socialists and direct-action anarchists assembled in the same space. Police pre-emptively arrested some of the anarchists, who were then reduced to ‘marching from A to B’ with the socialists instead of actively disrupting the conference as they had hoped. The socialists described the event as empowering and self-affirming, due to the numbers and determination of the crowd. The anarchists described it as disempowering and demoralizing; over and above the police intervention itself, the consequent lack of support for their aims, the pouring rain and the other factors which contributed to their miserable experience, what depressed them was the form of the mobilization itself, which they regarded as politically alien (Drury et al., 2005).
The role of identity-congruence in empowerment and disempowerment has also been demonstrated experimentally. In one study, the example of the Greek Mayday demonstration described above was used in a vignette (Evripidou & Drury, 2013a, Study 2). In one condition, the event was presented as successful whereas in the other condition it was presented as unsuccessful. The basic finding, that participants reported more collective joy and group efficacy for the successful than the unsuccessful version of events, was moderated by identification with the Greek anti-austerity movement; low identifiers were indifferent to the outcomes, whereas high identifiers felt joyful and efficacious in response to the successful mobilization (when congruence can be presumed to be high), but unhappy and powerless in relation to the unsuccessful mobilization (when congruence can be presumed to be low). Moreover, subjective reports of congruence were found to mediate these effects of congruent versus incongruent scenarios. 
However, there was a possible confound in this study. We didn't simply vary the outcome of the event (building vs. not building the movement), we also described the collective activity itself differently for each condition (a well-organized vs. a poorly organized demonstration). Thus, in a second study, we kept the form of the collective activity constant and just manipulated the identity-congruence of outcome. We also improved on the design by getting the participants apparently to undertake collective action, rather than using a vignette. In this experiment (Drury, Choudhury, Van Zomeren, & Sumner, 2012, Study 3), we first imposed two plausible identities on Sussex University students, by telling one half of the sample that previous research had found Sussex students to rate value for money above other issues when it came to the campus shops and telling the other half that Sussex students rate ‘fair trade’ values most highly. We then asked all participants to take part in a survey that would supposedly inform the students’ union decision on their policy for the campus shops in the coming year. Two weeks later, participants were first given (false) feedback on their own responses on the survey, to reaffirm which group they were in (value for money or fair trade). Then, half of each group were told that the survey had found in favour of their group’s view, while the other half of each group were told that the survey had found in favour of the opposite view. Thus all participants had taken part in the same collective decision-making mechanism (the survey), yet for half of them the outcome of their action was identity-congruent while for the other half it was identity-incongruent. As expected, participants in the congruent conditions reported greater positive emotion than in the incongruent conditions, and this was the case irrespective of identity-content (fair trade or value for money). Subjective perceptions of success were found to mediate this effect of congruence on positive emotion. In line with predictions, there was an indirect effect of congruence condition on efficacy through perceptions of success: Congruence condition was associated with success and the latter with efficacy.
Definitions of success can change in and through collective action.
Definitions of success on a collective mobilization can vary not only ‘horizontally’ (when there are different subgroups in the same mobilization) but also chronologically. In some events, there is evidence of a process whereby participants come to redefine aims and definitions of success over time. One example is the case of animal rights activists trying to close down an animal laboratory and who had to overcome a police presence to do so; the aim of the action then became that of defeating the police; and when the group succeeded this was a cause of joy and enhanced confidence in the group, irrespective of the direct effects on the animal laboratory (Drury et al., 2005). Means were transformed into ends. 
In that particular example, the group already had particular ideas about the role of the police in society and the legitimacy of conflict with them. But other transformations within collective action entail a more profound and enduring psychological change in relations with other groups and hence in the content of identity itself. For example, in an anti-roads campaign, some of the campaigners’ original aim was simply stopping construction taking place in their local area. Later, the aim became to expose the illegitimacy of the authorities; protestors saw a set-piece eviction as a great success due to the widespread negative publicity given to police dragging protestors from precarious perches on the roofs of the condemned buildings (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Linked to that, the aim extended from the local campaign to opposing the national roads programme and injustice more broadly (Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003). For this group, what it meant to be an anti-roads campaign participant changed; and indeed many participants changed towards seeing themselves as ‘activists’ (Drury & Reicher, 2000).
As outlined above, the ESIM specifies the conditions and dynamics for such identity transformations to occur. According to the ESIM, it is a self-changed context, in which one is now positioned differently in relation to others, that changes self. This point is derived from the tenet of self-categorization theory, that (variable) social context defines identity (Turner et al., 1987). Analysis of this process in crowd settings elucidates the dynamic and novel potential of identity variability. Thus, for example, for those who changed from saving the local green to opposing the police, it was their own action in coming together as ‘peaceful protesters’ that (inadvertently) changed the context through which they defined themselves. Their participation in the mobilization took place in an intergroup context, where the police had a different understanding of legitimate conduct than the crowd and had the power to act upon this understanding. The police response (violent eviction) served to change the comparative context from ‘locals, activists vs. road-builders’ to ‘campaigners vs. police’ (Reicher & Drury, 2011). 
Extent of endurance of empowerment.
There are a number of possible conditions for a sense of empowerment to endure after the event that gave rise to it and to feed into future actions. One is whether the support evident in the collective action is perceived as representative of a wider movement, both horizontally and chronologically (Drury & Reicher, 1999). Thus the perception at the time that there is a high level of unity, and that others are determined, predicts reports of subsequent involvement (Drury et al., 2003, 2005). 
The endurance of feelings of empowerment can also be explained by the concept of collective self-objectification. That is, the endurance of an empowered collective self reflects the extent to which context, changed tangibly by collective action to reflect the group’s values, is itself perceived to endure. Again, this point is in line with the tenet of self-categorization theory that just as variability in self-categorization is a function of variability of context, so the persistence of particular self-stereotypes reflects situations in which the context is relatively stable (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). 
Psychosocial Consequences of Collective Empowerment
If collective action can produce feelings of empowerment as an outcome, then the psychological importance of subjective power extends beyond what happens within a single crowd event. Such feelings can have a number of psychosocial consequences subsequently. 
First, feelings of empowerment may affect participants’ motivation for involvement in subsequent collective action. Being inspired by collective action, and having more confidence in the movement and in themselves as movement actors, can lead to more participation in the future. For instance, interviews with 37 activists about empowering actions found that they referred to ‘confidence’ (in the collective and personally), ‘pride’, ‘enthusiasm’, ‘joy’, ‘feeling good’ and being ‘on a high’ (Drury et al., 2005). Twenty-one stated that their involvement increased due to their positive emotional experiences (and eight of these cited more than one case of increased involvement). 
This example suggests that it is not only emotions previously regarded as ‘negative’ (in particular anger) that predict collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2012); certain positive emotions can also drive people to act. However, since empowerment consists of a variety of affective and cognitive components, what needs to be established is whether it is the empowerment experience as whole or just certain of its components, perhaps in a particular sequence, that makes the difference. Thus, it could be that overcoming a powerful other is a positive emotional experience, but it is the knowledge of that overcoming rather than the emotion itself that leads to further collective action. The motivational role of one particular positive emotion (pride) following a successful collective action was examined in a two-stage survey of student protests against tuition fees by Tausch and Becker (2013). This study found that pride at success in the first phase exerted a significant indirect effect on action intentions via increased efficacy perceptions, over and above baseline efficacy and action intentions. 
As a second kind of psychosocial consequence, the empowerment that arises from collective action may affect people’s personal lives outside the protest event. Research on experiences in the women’s movement shows that campaigning can lead to greater personal self-confidence (Agronick & Duncan, 1998; Harford, & Hopkins, 1984). Similarly, there is a fascinating literature on women’s experiences of the 1984-5 UK miners’ strike, which shows how some of them developed a new confidence in themselves as women that then influenced their choices in terms of education, career and relationship (e.g., Salt & Layzell, 1985). Much of this change was due to their taking roles involving responsibility for the campaign, while some other types of change, such as politicization, were clearly linked to picket-line conflicts with police.
A third possible psychosocial consequence of empowerment relates to mental and physical health. Collective action can be physically demanding for participants. Participation in a demonstration march can lower the immune system; there may be tiredness, lack of food or water, stress and worry from police coercion and the threat of arrest, and the greater likelihood of injury. And over the long-term, activists often suffer burnout. Yet research has also found that successfully fighting back benefits mood, self-reported wellbeing and other indicators (Barreto, 2012; Evripidou & Drury, 2013b; Foster, 2013); that activists lead more fulfilled lives compared to non-activists (Klar & Kasser, 2009); and that activists also have greater happiness and fewer personal worries later in life (Boehnke & Wong, 2011).
Since activists usually participate collectively, these instances suggest that (empowering) collective action can be good for you. Though individual action may also be beneficial, there seems to be something qualitatively distinct about the wellbeing benefits of collective action. First, to the extent that we identify with the collective, we can benefit from our group’s successes, even if we are not involved. Second, the practice or self-objectification of the lone individual is inherently limited. As an individual you can complain about injustice, but as a group you can change it. It may be that the bigger the identity-congruent action-impact, the greater the sense of agency and joy; and hence perhaps the positive effects of action are greater for collectives than for individuals. These arguments are in line with but also extend the recent work on ‘the social cure’, showing that membership of psychological groups can enhance wellbeing in a number of ways (Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012).
Dealing with Defeat
A final important question about empowerment in collective action arises from the above discussion, especially in the present economic and political context. The question is that of how participants (particularly activists) cope with defeat (Milesi & Catellani, 2011). If defeat is disempowering, how do activists deal with those negative feelings and beliefs? In the context of working class retreat and austerity, when collective actions end in disappointment, how is hope still possible (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & Van Zomeren, 2013)? Many activists do continue despite the set-backs. Given what we have shown about the important motivating effects of empowerment, this activist resilience is clearly something that requires explanation. The question therefore is: Under what conditions do collective actors continue following a failure to objectify the collective self?
Addressing this important question, however, is also an opportunity to foreground a key point in the account of collective self-objectification that has largely been only implicit until now. This point is that all the different dimensions of impact discussed above are potentially contestable. That is, there is a vital strategic dimension to the process, at every stage. Consider the following questions: What kinds of evidence do participants select to determine whether the action is successful or unsuccessful? Just how important do participants regard the methods of the campaign — can they be construed as achievements in themselves? What do people define as the group aims in this context? More generally, do participants agree that the action-impact is necessarily (in)congruent with the group identity? And more generally still, what is the group identity anyway? The underlying point here is that, while the world is structured by groups (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987), the identity-contents and boundaries of those groups can be reconstrued — something which is particularly evident in the ‘political’ realm (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Thus, one thing that would-be leaders of movements try to do is to define goals and hence the scope of collective self-objectification such that the actions of the group are understood as both successful and identity-relevant (Drury & Reicher, 2009). The leader is not just an identity-entrepreneur but an identity-engineer, insofar as the structures and social realities created by a leader must be seen as objectifications of the collective identity (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). Thus, not only is the construal of categories key to mobilization (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), it is also crucial to dealing with defeat. Here we briefly examine two of the crucial conditions determining the scope for dealing with defeat through construal: affordances of context and identity resources. 
Affordances of context
We have seen that an important reason why material victories feel good and are inspiring is precisely because of their tangible nature. The fact that the world is now perceptibly different, that it has actually changed in line with our values and through our action, is the objective evidence of our collective agency. The objective effects of our action are the basis of beliefs about ourselves. But, by the same token, this objectivity sets a constraint on what can be claimed. 
Thus strategic arguments that an outcome is a ‘moral victory’ may not always achieve their intended effects. For example, Arthur Scargill, leader of the UK miners’ union, claimed a moral victory over the government when the miners were forced back to work having failed to prevent any of the pit closures they were striking against. The argument may have conferred legitimacy and ‘the moral high ground’, but it did not feel good to the miners or their supporters. It did not feel like a victory, and it did not make the end of the strike empowering. 
The idea that ‘material’ victories are more immediately empowering than ‘moral’ ones was tested in an experiment. In a vignette study, two outcomes for the Occupy campaign in St Paul’s, London, were presented (Drury et al., 2012, Study 3). In the first, the Occupiers managed to continue their occupation of the area next to St Paul’s Cathedral in the City of London, which a spokesman characterized as a ‘material victory’; in the second scenario, they were brutally evicted by police, which a spokesman said was a ‘moral victory’ because it showed the world the illegitimacy of those they were fighting against. Participants reported greater joy and efficacy in the ‘material victory’ condition, with joy moderated by identification (low identifiers were unaffected by the manipulation). In line with collective self-objectification, the most joyful people were those in the congruent (‘material victory’) condition who were strong believers that eviction was incongruent with group aims. 
In the field study on which this vignette was based, the claim that the violent, distressing eviction and demolition by the police of the chestnut tree symbolic of the campaign was a ‘moral victory’ was accepted intellectually, but the overriding emotions among participants were grief and despair not joy (Drury & Reicher, 2005). There was no evidence of a positive effect on group efficacy. Yet, importantly, the ‘moral’ aspect of what happened was the basis of subsequent discussions around the aims and legitimacy of campaign action, which in turn served to broaden the base of the campaign and so eventually increased group power (an example of mediated impact). The illegitimate eviction enhanced the participants’ sense both that they were right and, eventually, that they were part of a wider movement against forms of injustice. A key point here, however, is that the radicals’ arguments about the wider (political) significance of the campaign only became persuasive when, through the reconfigured relationship with the police, these radicals became positioned as fellow ingroup members rather than ‘outsiders’ (Drury et al., 2003). In short, the context constrained interpretations of the campaign.
Identity resources
The re-framing of negative events, as in the last example, may be an attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance or other aversion felt in defeat (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Einwohner, 2002). Whether or not there is such a cognitive need for consistency, the point we want to make is that it is much easier to argue that an event has positive qualities when there are the discursive resources available to make such an argument. Thus re-evaluation of the meaning of actions may be easier for some groups than for others, due to their access to such resources. For instance, one interview study found that experienced activists have certain identity-based discursive strategies available to them that could be used to counter the de-motivating effects of (apparent) failure (Drury et al., 2005). These strategies included being able to place experiences in a wider context (e.g. ‘just one battle within a long-term war’), activists reminding themselves of successful struggles (‘some you win, some you lose’), or characterizing particular defeats as ‘learning experiences’ from which they could develop. Each of these strategies was linked to the activists’ knowledge of the history of their campaign.
Being an experienced activist means not only having certain knowledge and arguments, but also being part of a milieu and hence being able to access discursive resources from others (i.e., in meetings, groups, social centres, publications etc.). These resources would not be easily accessible to political neophytes and those not socialized into the activist culture. Therefore, while experienced activists might feel philosophical after a set-back, the neophyte might instead feel defeated and demoralized (Drury et al., 2005). Both identity-based interpretative strategies and the social relations with the group giving support to such interpretations can therefore be understood as forms by which shared identity operates as a resource to provide continued motivation. 
These ideas were examined in the context of the G8 protests, Gleneagles, in 2005 (Barr & Drury, 2009). While those with less political experience found the protests disappointing and uninspiring, the more seasoned activists (re-)interpreted potentially disempowering events positively. An example was the re-evaluation of the role of the protest campsite, which came to be seen by activists as the central achievement instead of just a basis for the direct action. 
Conclusion
Subjective power is a crucial dimension of collective action and is recognized in different ways by a variety of theoretical perspectives. This is not to say that an account of empowerment is a complete account of the social psychology of collective action itself. (For recent review articles covering other relevant factors in collective action, see Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2012, Thomas et al., 2012, and Van Zomeren et al., 2012.) However, while a consideration of subjective power may not be sufficient in understanding the nature of collective action, we suggest that is necessary for two reasons.
The first reason is that subjective power is an essential dimension of identity itself. This has been an underlying argument throughout this chapter. To be a subject — a self — entails some sense of one’s ability to put one’s intentions into practice. Put differently, identity is in part a definition of possible action (Reicher & Drury, 2011). In line with the literature, we have argued in this chapter that collective action is based on shared social identity. This means that collective action requires not only a definition of who ‘we’ are but also an understanding of what ‘we’ can do. 
The second reason that subjective power is necessary to the understanding of collective action should also be clear from what we have argued in this chapter. Empowerment — that positive social psychological transformation that takes place for members of subordinated groups who overturn existing relations of dominance (Drury & Reicher, 2009) — can be an exhilarating, life-transforming and emotional experience for collective actors. This is evident in historical examples; and it is what collective actors talk about passionately when surveyed and interviewed about their participation. Empowerment is the link between the phenomenological and the political in the collective action process. It matters to collective actors involved in trying to create social change, and therefore it should matter to those of us who study collective action. 
If subjective power is necessary to the understanding of collective action, it is also the case that collective action helps us understand empowerment. In this chapter we have shown that the study of collective action, particularly in the form of crowd events, can provide new insights about the intersection between power and identity. Crowd events have features that make them different from other group contexts or collective actions: They are unstructured, often less predictable and liable to change. It is these qualities, among others, that make crowd events especially useful for the study of identity and power. Specifically, crowds provide their members with the means to enact otherwise subordinate identities. As we have described, when people share an identity in a crowd, they perceive support for ingroup-normative actions, and hence they are able to act and to coordinate. Their collective actions are attempts to make the values shared in the crowd an objective, tangible reality. In successful collective action, a world in which the identity is subordinate to that of other groups is transformed into one in which that identity has recognition, agency and power. Hence, through identity enactment, crowds can alter the social relations on which those identities are based. This is what we meant by saying that empowerment can operate as both ‘input’ and ‘output’ in collective action. This chapter has indicated some of the processes, both psychological and chronological, through which this dynamic operates.
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^1	  This same concept has been referred to in some places as ‘collective self-realization’ (e.g., Reicher & Haslam, 2010). Reicher (2012) argues that collective self-objectification refers to enactment that involves overcoming another group, whereas collective self-realization does not, hence the latter is a more appropriate term for collective enactment in such events as religious ceremonies. Pehrson, Stevenson, Muldoon and Reicher (2013) add that the concept of collective self-objectification can also be usefully applied to non-conflictual crowd events, such as parades, where there are dominant and subordinate groups.
^2	  ‘if one was to single out the most fundamental idea in The German Ideology, which is discovered in the 1844 Manuscripts and is assumed by Capital, it would be that man [sic] produces himself through labour... There is ... a dialectically conceived relation between his nature as determined by the conditions of his life, and the practical transformation of those conditions. The link between the two is labour — in the broadest sense.’ (Arthur, 1970, p. 21; emphasis in original). The notion of alienated labour — labour which, since it is for an alien subject (capital), denies our subjectivity, interests and being — is therefore based on the notion of free labour, i.e., that which affirms us as human subjects. In each case, our own activity makes our subjectivity.
